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Post by alanstepney on Apr 1, 2015 10:42:47 GMT
The last time I walked round there, I was less-than-impressed by the condition of the track. IMHO, it needed a lot of maintainance / relaying.
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Post by ejparrott on Apr 1, 2015 11:25:54 GMT
I've added a few more notes to my previous post now, and in my absence Julian has posted some more, all of which I completely agree with. I had set out merely to point out the dangerous parts, and some are more poor engine management but I nevertheless agree.
There is a video on Youtube of a day in the cab with Blanche on the FR. If you watch that you'll see that the crew barely take their eyes off the road, and while you can't always see both driver and fireman, I can assure you between them they will have been keeping an eye on the train. I don't like that video either but it serves as a good instructional point. They thrash Blanche on that trip, poor old girl's got absolutely nothing left to give, for most of the trip above Blodge the regulator is literally wide open, she's got nothing left...no way to drive an engine. They may have been late after adding 2 more coaches - and that was an un-called for flap and panic aswell - but there's never any excuse for thrashing an engine. I don't think I've ever seen a TR engine with it's regulator wide open.
We should perhaps also point out that the video of Poole was published in 2009, are comments about it are drawn on years of experience, and are in no way at all intended to be linked to the recent accident, for one we don't even know if the operator is still the same, and they should not be taken as any indication as to what actually happened in such a way to influence the investigation.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 1, 2015 11:58:37 GMT
I've nothing new to add about this specific derailment and it's causes .
With good management of a miniature railway derailments should be rare - but they are certainly going to happen .
Perhaps passenger coaches with modern safety features are needed for the larger scale railways so that in event of derailment risk of injury is reduced .
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Post by Deleted on Apr 1, 2015 12:16:52 GMT
Perhaps passenger coaches with modern safety features are needed for the larger scale railways so that in event of derailment risk of injury is reduced . That may be the way to go where possible Michael...many raised tracks have checkrails so full derailments are unlikely unless travelling at high speed..IMHO some drivers certainly go too fast for my liking. Looking at the railway in question, how flat it is and with little obstruction I wonder if something simple like castors under the coach bodies would help stop any toppling over when derailed...it wouldn't stop a derailment itself but then again i doubt it's possible to fully guarantee this but it would stop the carriages from falling over and this is where injuries are most likely to occur. pete
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Post by keith6233 on Apr 1, 2015 14:26:36 GMT
One of the main things that will be looked at is records of maintenance and inspections of track and stock and all other equipment.
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Post by alanstepney on Apr 1, 2015 15:28:11 GMT
I was one of the people who was asked to examine the data from the Medina, Ohio, traction engine disaster. What did surprise me was how open the authorities were and how much information they made available to us. Their sole objective seemed to be to find the cause and suggest ways of preventing something similar happening in the future.
I hope, I REALLY hope that the same happens here, rather than the attitude I have seen in (UK)industry where finding someone to blame and ways of escaping it, or some hidden agenda, seems to be commonplace.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 2, 2015 12:10:29 GMT
just seen this on FB, seems Network Rail weren't to happy with Tangmere's antics last month and rightly so.. Pete
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Post by Roger on Apr 2, 2015 12:17:10 GMT
I just googled that and this document popped up in the search results... It's a wonder anyone operates any trains at all. The legal department must have had a field day making all this stuff up.
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jackrae
Elder Statesman
Posts: 1,333
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Post by jackrae on Apr 2, 2015 12:48:28 GMT
Did you read the signature name on behalf of Network Rail (last page)
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Post by keith6233 on Apr 2, 2015 16:12:04 GMT
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Post by Deleted on Apr 2, 2015 16:31:12 GMT
there's this as well...seems WCR didn't do themselves any favours with this one and have caused concern before.......this was just posted on FB
Section from statement by Network Rail: Network Rail believes that an Event of Default has occurred because a breach of the Safety Obligations has already taken place or, in the alternative, is reasonably likely to take place. You are aware that Network Rail has had concerns about WCR’s performance of its Safety Obligations for some time and recent events lead Network Rail to believe that the operations of WCR are a threat to the safe operation of the railway. Specifically: WCR’s senior management response to the recent SPAD at SN45. This ranked as the most serious SPAD that has taken place this year when the industry risk ranking methodology was applied; The response by the senior management of WCR to the issues raised in the meeting of 30 March 2015, where WCR demonstrated that its controls, communication and commitment following the recent SPAD were inadequate; Network Rail also has serious concerns about the fact that WCR unilaterally suspended the response to Network Rail’s review of WCR’s Safety Management System undertaken in January 2015. The review raised some serious and significant issues and there was no communication with Network Rail to explain that the response was being suspended.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 2, 2015 16:34:18 GMT
and there's more:
What WCR must do to have the ban lifted: This Suspension Notice will take effect from 00.00 on Friday 3rd April 2015. The restriction imposed on WCR while this Suspension Notice is in force is that no Services may operate on any Routes. Network Rail considers that the Event of Default is capable of remedy. Network Rail considers that the steps required to remedy the Event of Default are: 1. Introduce an effective, risk-based driver monitoring regime that includes proactively using analysis of On Train Data Recorder downloads for a representative and sufficient sample of diagrams; 2. Demonstrate there is in place an effective and secure system of tamper-evident seals for train protection isolator cocks on all relevant traction; 3. Implement arrangements to accurately record, monitor and manage all train protection activations (including Automatic Warning System and Train Protection and Warning System), and provide clear instructions to all train crew, including support crew, on the actions expected of them report and respond to train protection activation; 4. Establish a time-bound plan to recommence and complete implementation of the actions arising from Network Rail’s review of WCR’s Safety Management System in January 2015; 5. Review and implement appropriate changes to company processes to be able to demonstrate that all safety and operational information is received and positively acknowledged by train drivers; 6. Demonstrate by independent assurance that there is an effective system for managing access to traction footplates/cabs in traffic, with clear communication protocols; and 7. Clarify the safety accountabilities for each Director and independently review the effectiveness of the company’s safety assurance and governance arrangements to demonstrate that those accountabilities are discharged.
NR requires the following timescales to be met for the actions identified above: 1. Action 1-5 inclusive should be completed by 15 May 2015; and. 2. Material demonstrable progress towards the completion of actions 6 and 7 must also be achieved by 15 May 2015. Should these actions be achieved within these timescales to the reasonable satisfaction of Network Rail then the Suspension Notice will be withdrawn.
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Post by digger on Apr 2, 2015 16:58:32 GMT
Perhaps passenger coaches with modern safety features are needed for the larger scale railways so that in event of derailment risk of injury is reduced . That may be the way to go where possible Michael...many raised tracks have checkrails so full derailments are unlikely unless travelling at high speed..IMHO some drivers certainly go too fast for my liking. Looking at the railway in question, how flat it is and with little obstruction I wonder if something simple like castors under the coach bodies would help stop any toppling over when derailed...it wouldn't stop a derailment itself but then again i doubt it's possible to fully guarantee this but it would stop the carriages from falling over and this is where injuries are most likely to occur. pete Possibly the most effective way would be to have solid bar couplings fitted into sturdy drag boxes, that would only allow the train to tilt rather than turn over. Digger
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Post by alanstepney on Apr 3, 2015 6:44:15 GMT
and there's more: The restriction imposed on WCR while this Suspension Notice is in force is that no Services may operate on any Routes. . If I was WCR, I would shut the doors and send everyone home. Plus direst all enquiries to Network Rail. Once there were no trains running, and network Rail was inundated with calls etc, I suspect the public and the media mught want to know the reasons.
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Post by Roger on Apr 3, 2015 7:10:02 GMT
It seems to me that WCR need to engage more with Network Rail and be more professional with their relationship with them. It's all very nice running steam trains on the mainline network, but it's WCR's responsibility to take on whatever driver training and management procedures that are neccesary to make that possible. Reading the above makes them sound amateurish and incident prone, it certainly doesn't fill me with confidence. It's deadly dull and painful to go through the hoops that Network Rail impose, but it's not WCR's right to use the network, it's a privilege that has to be earned by demonstrated competence. They simply don't seem to be doing that.
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Post by ejparrott on Apr 3, 2015 7:58:26 GMT
I have a feeling, probably wrong, that WCR are not the easiest of people to work with and don't take kindly to NR telling them off. They've hit the headlines a lot recently, what with the fire ban debarcle on the ECML
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Post by Boadicea on Apr 3, 2015 7:59:30 GMT
If I was WCR, I would shut the doors and send everyone home. Plus direct all enquiries to Network Rail. Once there were no trains running, and network Rail was inundated with calls etc, I suspect the public and the media might want to know the reasons. I think not. Surely NR have taken the action we would expect, given the circumstances.
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Post by marshall5 on Apr 3, 2015 8:42:30 GMT
I have the greatest respect for Alan but can't help feeling that he has missed the point here. As I pointed out in a previous post an HST doing 125mph had passed through the junction just 1 minute before Tangmere ran through the signals and actually stopped straddling the junction. A major disaster was avoided by sheer good luck (the steam special was running 1 min late). There is no excuse for such sloppy enginemanship and I believe that NR are quite right to suspend all WRC operations until WRC 'put their house in order'. I look forward to reading the official ORR report as I suspect that it will reveal some, shall we say,'interesting' operating practices. Ray.
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Post by keith6233 on Apr 3, 2015 8:49:21 GMT
Just to get this thread back to miniature railways which is what i think we are all about,as your club completed a risk assessment and are you all working to it.
The recent news letter from the Northern Association gives a list of recent claims and should make everybody look at how they run there railway.In the event of a claim the insurers require a copy of your risk assessment ,the similarity with the big railway then becomes apparent.
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jma1009
Elder Statesman
Posts: 5,901
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Post by jma1009 on Apr 3, 2015 11:17:27 GMT
i have worked with WCR crews some 10 years ago including the legendary driver Bill Andrews.
there are sadly very few drivers with the required route knowledge plus passed for steam on the national network, and usually 2 or more crews are required for a mainline trip so that a driver doesnt go 'over his hours'.
everyone knows that one of the worst things a driver can do is go through a red signal - these days called a 'SPAD'. as soon as this occurs he must phone the signalman, and the train will be held whilst the driver is taken off the train, suspended, and tested for drugs or alcohol, and a relief driver provided, and an investigation is carried out.
there are lots of reasons why a 'SPAD' may occur and there may be all sorts of mitigating circumstances. however if there are no mitigating circumstances the driver will face the sack/demotion.
if a SPAD occurs involving a steam loco, it may be extrememly difficult to arrange for a relief driver.
in the recent TANGMERE incident, it would appear that the driver immobilised the automatic safety devices to prevent the brakes coming on. that would be very unusual and would be a serious aggravating factor.
a railway junction 'SPAD' is also treated as very serious for obvious reasons.
Network Rail obviously require all companies who use the national network to have in place very strict procedures to prevent these incidents occuring, plus investigating them when they do occur. if a franchised company operating part of the network has too many SPADS it risks the same sort of sanctions that have been placed on WCR.
poor old TANGMERE does seem to have a lot of bad luck recently. it wasnt that long ago that one of the conn rods fell off.
cheers, julian
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